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Abstract 
 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court to hold power of reviewing the constitutionality of 
Laws raises discourse on the distinction between constitutional interpretation and statutory inter-
pretation. In judicial review cases, the separation, either in common law or civil law tradition, 
between the two interpretations is not clearly distinguished. The Indonesian Constitutional Court, in 
judicial review decisions, shows that the Court does not only interpret constitutional provision. In a 
number of decisions, the Court has put more emphasis on the use of statutory interpretation. The 
essay discusses the Constitutional Court practice in the use of constitutional interpretation and sta-
tutory interpretation on judicial review cases. 
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Abstrak 
 
Keberadaan Mahkamah Konstitusi yang memegang kekuasaan untuk melakukan pengujian Undang-Un-
dang mengungkit wacana pembedaan antara penafsiran konstitusi dengan penafsiran Undang-Undang. 
Dalam praktek pengujian Undang-Undang, baik pada sistem hukum common law maupun civil law, pe-
misahan antara keduanya tidaklah terdapat garis batas yang tegas. Mahkamah Konstitusi, dalam per-
kara pengujian Undang-Undang, tidak hanya melakukan penafsiran konstitusi terhadap pasal-pasal 
konstitusi. Dalam beberapa kasus pengujian konstitusional, Mahkamah Konstitusi justru lebih mene-
kankan pada penafsiran Undang-Undang. Tulisan ini membahas mengenai praktek yang dilakukan oleh 
Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam upaya melakukan penafsiran konstitusi dan penafsiran Undang-Undang 
melalui putusan-putusannya pada perkara pengujian Undang-Undang terhadap Undang-Undang Dasar. 
 
Kata Kunci  : Mahkamah Konstitusi, pengujian undang-undang, penafsiran konstitusi, penafsiran un-
dang-undang  
 
 
Introduction 
The Indonesian Constitutional Court (Mah-
kamah Konstitusi, MK) is the final interpreter of 
the Constitution. The role is associated with the 
court’s power to review the Laws which are in 
contradiction with the Constitution as stipulated 
in article 24C of the 1945 Constitution (UUD 
1945).  Lawyers, legal scholars, and state insti-
tutions may also interpret the Constitution. Non-
etheless, the power of the Court to interpret the 
Constitution is stipulated in the constitution. 
Hence, whenever the Court has given an inter-
pretation to a certain constitutional provision, it 
has the force to legally binding all citizens to re-
spect and uphold. Any interpretation by parties 
shall adhere to the Court’s ruling.  
A question raised upon the issue that does 
it mean MK will always provide a constitutional 
interpretation in carrying out its authority of 
constitutional review? To answer the question, 
one must look upon distinction between consti-
tutional interpretation and statutory interpreta-
tion. The discussion of this separation is more 
developed in countries with common law sys-
tem.1 Meanwhile in countries putting more em-
                                            
1 James Allan, “Constitutional Interpretation V. Statutory 
Interpretation: Understanding the Attractions of “Origi-
nal Intent””, Legal Theory, Vol. 6 No. 1, March 2000, p. 
109–126; David Feldman, “Statutory Interpretation and 
Constitutional Legislation, Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 
130, 2014, p. 480; Kent Greenwalt, “Are Mental States 
Relevant for Statutory and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion”, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 85 Issue 6, 2000, p. 
1611-1612. 
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phasis on codified laws, such as Indonesia, theo-
retical discussion on distinction of constitutional 
and statutory interpretation is not contested at 
length. The line between constitutional and sta-
tutory interpreta-tion in examination of consti-
tutional review cases is indefinite.  
The similar situation happened in MK dur-
ing the review of the constitutionality of Laws. 
In constitutional review cases, the Court does 
not necessarily requisite to provide an interpret-
ation of constitutional article. The constitutional 
provision in the review cases are used mostly as 
a ground to review the constitutionality of Law. 
It is a tool of reference to check whether the 
Laws is in conformity with the constitution or 
not. The constitutional provision is not the ob-
ject of review, thus the Court need not to give 
interpretation. On the other hand, the Law in 
question is a subject of review, accordingly the 
Court have to discuss at length on the issue. In 
other words, the Court provides a statutory in-
terpretation to the Law in question. This paper 
argues that MK does not have any legal-formal 
obligation to interpret any articles in the Consti-
tution especially when the Court consider it has 
a clear meaning. Nonetheless, the Court is 
bound to give reasoned deliberation in its de-
cision making. In doing so, the Court does not 
make any boundary on the way of serving inter-
pretation, whether it is a constitutional or sta-
tutory interpretation. There is few studies that 
provide information on how MK interpret the 
constitution,2 however none of which focuses on 
the distinction between constitutional and sta-
tutory interpretation. Therefore, it is important 
to set the background prior to discussing how 
the court applies constitutional or statutory in-
terpretation in judicial review cases. In that no-
tion, the first part of the discussion in this essay 
is to draw the debate among scholars on distinc-
tion between constitutional interpretation and 
statutory interpretation. Afterward, this essay 
                                            
2  Muchamad Ali Safaat, Aan Eko Widiarto and Fajar Lakso-
no, “Pola Penafsiran Konstitusi dalam Putusan Mahka-
mah Konstitusi Periode 2003-2008 dan 2009-2013”, Jur-
nal Konstitusi, Vol. 14 No. 2, Juni 2017, p. 243; Tanto 
Lailam, “Penafsiran Konstitusi dalam Pengujian Konsti-
tusionalitas Undang-Undang terhadap Undang-Undang 
Dasar 1945, Jurnal Media Hukum, Vol. 21 No. 1, 2014, 
p. 93. 
will turn to survey the Court’s decisions to seek 
common approach employed as a method to sol-
ve the constitutional cases. The research aims to 
seek any pattern commonly used by the Court to 
interpret the Constitution, as well as to inter-
pret the statute that was in question. 
 
Discussion 
Distinguishing Constitutional and Statutory In-
terpretation   
Some constitutional scholars argue that 
the constitutional interpretation differs from the 
statutory interpretation.3 It is not only due to 
the constitution’s hierarchical position in a legal 
order but also the abstract nature of most con-
stitutional provisions made the constitution dif-
fer from statute. Hence, the difference between 
statutes and constitution is the political nature 
of constitutional provisions. The constitutional 
norms are much more abstract than the stat-
utory norms. The constitution considers as more 
political because the issues are highly at stake. 
It concerns the structure of society and the in-
stitutional arrangement of bodies that hold poli-
tical power.  
However, there are some scholars that re-
jected the distinction. They argue that a distinc-
tion between constitutional and statutory inter-
pretation in terms of nature is somehow myth 
and harmful.4 Andras Jakab stated that “...the 
methods of constitutional interpretation are 
thus not different from the methods of statutory 
interpretation, only the emphasis placed on the 
specific methods and the frequency of their use 
are different.”5 
In a study which comparing the constitu-
tional interpretation by referring to the US Su-
preme Court as the representation of common 
law system with the German Constitutional 
Court as one of the homes of civil law found that 
                                            
3 Kevin M. Stack, “The Divergence of Constitutional and 
Statutory Interpretation”, University of Colorado Law 
Review, Vol. 75 No. 1, March 2004, p. 2; Hon. Antonin 
Scalia and John F. Manning, “A Dialogue on Statutory 
and Constitutional Interpretation”, The George Wash-
ington Law Review, Vol. 80, 2012, p. 1610-1612. 
4 Andras Jakab, “Judicial Reasoning in the Constitutional 
Courts: A European Perspective”, German Law Journal, 
Vol.14 No. 8, August 2013, p.1225. 
5 Ibid. 
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there was no significant difference between the 
two. The study concluded that  
“... the difference between the common 
law and civil law traditions regarding le-
gal reasoning is not crucial to constitu-
tional interpretation because both Ger-
man and US constitutional adjudicators 
supply a meaning to the abstract consti-
tutional provisions based on their value 
choices. In this context, German constitu-
tional interpretation has more similarities 
than differences with its US counter-
part.”6 
 
As an influential representative of civil law tra-
dition, legal positivism is deeply rooted in the 
German legal system. The principle of positiv-
ism is that the law should be separated from 
morals, politics, and other fields. Instead, the 
law should be based on reason and logic.7 The 
judiciary function as mechanical application of 
legal rules. However, a further development 
shows that the positivist legal tradition is not 
merely legitimate basis in the constitutional ad-
judication. The authority to conduct constitu-
tional review adopted in civil law countries has 
blurred the line between constitutional inter-
pretation and statutory interpretation.  
The practice of judicial review in the civil 
law countries serves space to the judiciary to 
make interpretation of the constitution for mea-
suring the constitutionality of the norm in Laws 
and not just to interpret the Laws.8 An example 
of this is ruled issued by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in Princess Soraya case.9 
Princess Soraya is the former wife of the Shah of 
Iran who filed a constitutional case for defama-
tion by Die Welt magazine for publishing a fic-
                                            
6 Mher Arshakyan, “The Impact of Legal System on Consti-
tutional Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis: The US 
Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional 
Court”,German Law Journal, Vol.14 No. 08, August 2013, 
p. 1324. 
7 Donald P. Kommers, 1997, The Constitutional Jurispru-
dence of The Federal Republic of Germany, Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, p.40 
8 D. Neil Mac Cormick and Robert P. Sommers (eds.), 
1991, Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study, Al-
dershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd., p.37; Joseph 
Dainow, “The Civil Law dan the Common Law: Some 
Points of Comparison”, The American Journal of Com-
parative Law, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1966 - 1967), p. 419-435 
9 Princess Soraya Case (1973), 34 Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany 269, Decision of the Second Senate. 
titious interview which disclosed her personal 
life. She claims civil damages for this act yet the 
laws in Germany remains silent. Defamation is a 
criminal issue and not regulated under German 
civil law. In consequence, the injured party for 
defamation does not obtain any compensation. 
The Federal Constitutional Court ruled to grant 
Princess Soraya’s petition and added civil law 
rule which previously did not regulate the remu-
neration of indemnification for defamation. The 
law is controversial since the German Basic Law 
stipulates that judiciary is bound by law and jus-
tice. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court 
cannot change legislation issued by Parliament. 
On this restriction, the Federal Constitutional 
Court coined the socalled holistic method of le-
gal interpretation.  
“The interpretation is the method and 
way by which the judge inquires into the 
content of a statute, considering its pla-
cement within the whole legal order, with 
out being restricted by the formal word-
ing. ... the law is not identical with the 
whole of the written statutes. Over and 
above the positive enactments of the sta-
te power there can be ‘ein Mehr an Recht’ 
(a surplus of law) which has its source in 
the constitutional legal order as a holistic 
unity of meaning, and which can operate 
as a corrective to the written law; to find 
it and to deliver it in decisions is the task 
of adjudication.”10 
 
The German Constitutional Court, in a way, 
adopted the American vision of law. The com-
mon law tradition embedded the vision illustra-
ted by Oliver Wendell Holmes’s aphorism as “the 
life of the law has not been the logic, it has 
been experience.” The Court is guided not only 
by logic and reason but the decisions are also 
provided by the judges’ experience, necessities 
of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories.11 
                                            
10 Daniel A. Farber. “Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Inter-
pretation in Comparative Perspective”, Cornell Law Re-
view, Vol. 81, No. 2, January 1996, p. 520 (the author 
provide translation to English on Princess Soraya Case).   
11 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 2000, The Common Law, 
Project Gutenberg, Available on website: http://www. 
gutenberg.org/files/2449/2449-h/2449-h.htm, accessed 
on January 20th, 2018. 
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The question on constitutional review is 
not only about legitimacy but also about the 
proper methods of constitutional interpretation. 
The constitution served to safeguard fundamen-
tal values and unifying the nation. On the other 
hand, the constitution should also be flexible 
enough to address social changes. To evolve, it 
can only be achieved through interpretation. 
Some scholars argue that Constitution is subject 
to special interpretive methods as comparing to 
other sources of law. They coined it as “consti-
tutional exceptionalism”.12 Chemerinsky also on-
ce said that “... if the Constitution is to serve its 
functions of protecting fundamental values and 
unifying society, the judiciary should have subs-
tantial discretion in determining the meaning of 
specific constitutional provisions.”13 The inter-
pretation of the Constitution will be supplied by 
judges based on contemporary values. He, then, 
added that “... any attempt to define limits on 
interpretation process or find an interpretation 
model will eventually fail because constitutional 
interpretation is indeterminate.14 It is because 
that there is no single correct answer to the vast 
majority of constitutional cases presented befo-
re the court. 
 
The Court Discretion to Interpret the Consti-
tution 
As Chemerinsky note that judiciary should 
have “substantial discretion” in interpretation 
process, the question is to what degree is the 
discretion should be applied? In the US Supreme 
Court practices, judges have a high degree of 
discretion. A few factor made to the conclusion 
are: first, the difficulties for the identification 
of the ratio decidendi; second, the indetermin-
acy of precedents; third, the possibility of a new 
case arising that is not covered; and fourth, the 
under-determination of analogical reasoning.15 
                                            
12  Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe, “Is the Constitu-
tion Special?”, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 101, 2016, p. 
702. 
13 Erwin Chemerinsky, 1987, Interpreting The Constitu-
tion, New York: Preager, p. 126. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Federico Jose Arena, “Which Kind of Discretion in Con-
stitutional Adjudication? A Discussion of Mher Arshak-
yan’s The Impact of Legal Systems on Constitutional In-
terpretation: A Comparative Analysis: The U.S. Supreme 
In Indonesia, the use of principles embod-
ied in the Constitution as the basis to review the 
Laws is part of the discretion despite its low oc-
currence. In some cases, the legal argument in 
the decision of the Court does not refer to an 
article in the Constitution. Rather, the Court ex-
plicitly named a set of constitutional value as 
the ground to review the constitutionality of the 
Law. The study found few rulings to be high-
lighted where the court uses legal principles 
namely the principle of justice and presumption 
of innocence. 
The use of the principle of justice is seen 
in the Court decision on the requirement to run 
for head of local government. The Law on Local 
Government on article 59 paragraph (5) letter g 
Law Number 12 Year 2008 requires public ser-
vant to resign from their post if he is running as 
a candidate for head of local government. This 
condition was challenged by a citizen who was a 
public official intended to run for mayor of 
Bandarlampung.16 The petitioner argues that the 
requirement is unconstitutional because it is 
against “equal treatment” principle as implicitly 
stipulated in article 28D (1) of the Constitution, 
“every person shall be entitled to recognition, 
guarantee, protection and equitable legal cer-
tainty as well as equal treatment before the 
law”. In comparison, he puts forward the ex-
ample of public official who runs for the second 
term in office did not have to resign. In the de-
cision, the Court concluded that "... it is not 
considered as unjust if there are offices which 
have different election process." The court is 
soundless on consideration of Article 28D (1) on 
the Constitution. However, the Court expressed 
that “justice” is not always an equal treatment. 
Justice, as the Court stated, can be defined as 
“... treat differently on two different things is 
justice. On the contrary, it is unjust to have 
equal treatment on two different things.”17 
In terms of the notion of presumption of 
innocence, it was reviewed by the Court in a 
case brought by a former regent of Sarolangun. 
                                            
Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court”, 
German Law Journal, Vol 14 No 8, August 2013, p. 1339. 
16 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republic of Indo-
nesia Number 4/PUU-VIII/2010. 
17 Ibid., para. [3.21]. 
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He was dismissed from the office by the Ministry 
of Interior because of corruption allegation, as it 
was regulated by Law.18 The petitioner argues 
that the Law is unconstitutional since there was 
no final decision delivered by the Special Court 
for Corruption cases yet. The Ministry and the 
Law, according to the petitioner, have breached 
his constitutional right of presumption of inno-
cence. The Constitution does not clearly men-
tion “presumption of innocence” as one of the 
citizen’s rights. However, the Court raised and 
consider it as implied rights. The Court argues 
that "...it is important to assert that presump-
tion of innocence is a principle in criminal law 
that protects the right of defendant to be pre-
sumed innocent until a legally binding decision 
imposed. Such right is guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, as part of the rule of law, in addition, 
it is a part of civil and political right which 
must, therefore, be respected, protected, and 
be guaranteed.”19 Government action to dischar-
ge the petitioner from the office is considering 
inappropriate act and against the basic notion of 
presumption of innocence. 
As a comparison, in the US, presumption 
of innocence finds its constitutional basis in Due 
Process Clause within the US Constitution. It is a 
fundamental principle in American Criminal Law 
which rooted back from the Magna Carta then 
reinforced the principle within common law tra-
dition.20 In contrast, in civil law tradition espe-
cially in France, the principle has rooted back 
since medieval with the formulation of the prin-
ciple “innocent until proven guilty” introduced 
by Johannes Monachus.21      
 
The Court’s Interpretation to the Constitutio-
nal Provision 
In its reasoning within the decisions, the 
Constitutional Court provides an interpretation 
                                            
18 Article 31 (1) Law Number 12 Year 2008. 
19 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republik of Indo-
nesia Number 024/PUU-III/2005, p. 36-37. 
20  Shima Baradaran, “Restoring the Presumption of Inno-
cence”, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol 72 No 4, 2011, p. 
727. 
21  Francois Quintard-Morenas, “The Presumption of Inno-
cence in the French and Anglo-American Legal Tradi-
tions, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 
58 Issue 1, January 2010, p. 114-116. 
to the constitutional provision before examining 
the constitutionality of the Law under review. 
Few examples of which are when the Court in-
terpreted the phrase "state-controlled right" as 
stipulated in Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution 
and the arrangement to hold simultaneous elec-
tions. 
Article 33 paragraph (2) and (3) of the 
Constitution stipulated that “Sectors of pro-
duction which are important for the country and 
affect the life of the people shall be under the 
powers of the State” and “The land, the waters 
and the natural resources within shall be under 
the powers of the State and shall be used to the 
greatest benefit of the people”.22 The notion of 
“under the power of the state” or “under state-
controlled” have been long-debated.23 In the 
review of electricity law (Law No. 20 of 2002) 
case, the court put a strong emphasis on the 
need to give explanation to the notion of 
“state-controlled” before examining the consti-
tutionality of electricity law.  
The Court provides that “state-controll-
ed” consisted of five cumulative elements: poli-
cy making (beleid), administrative (bestuurs-
daad) managerial (beheersdaad), supervisory 
(toezichthoudensdaad) and regulation (regelen-
daad).24 Many argue that these elements are in-
fluenced by the writings of Wolfgang Fried-
mann.25 In his idea of welfare state, Friedmann 
closely related his argument to the state prima-
ry function as: first, provider of social services; 
second, regulator of private economy; third, 
entrepreneur of a nationalized public sector; 
and fourth, umpire.26 
Within this newly developed understand-
ing on the notion of “state-controlled”, the 
Court uses the same framework to examine on 
                                            
22 Translation to english as provided on www.constitute 
project.com 
23  Kuntana Magnar, Inna Junaenah and Giri Ahmad Taufik, 
“Tafsir MK atas Pasal 33 UUD 1945: Studi Atas Putusan 
MK Mengenai Judicial Review UU No. 7/2004, UU No. 
22/2001, dan UU No. 20/2002, Jurnal Konstitusi, Vol. 7 
No. 1, February 2010, p. 120-121. 
24 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republik of Indo-
nesia Number 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003, p. 334. 
25 Mohamad Mova Al’afghani, ”The Elements of State Cont-
rol”, the Jakarta Post, January 14th, 2013. 
26 Wolfgang Friedmann, 1971, The State and The Rule of 
Law in A Mixed Economy, London: Stevens, p.5 
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other constitutional cases. For example, in the 
review of the Law on Oil and Gas (Law Number 
22 Year 2001)27 and in the review of water re-
sources law (Law Number 7 Year 2004).28 
Another interpretation provided by the 
Court on constitutional provision is on the ar-
rangement of election. After the downfall of Su-
harto, Indonesia has successfully held national 
and local elections. In terms of national elec-
tion, the electoral process for members of par-
liament was held separately with the presiden-
tial election. The constitution is quiet on this 
issue. However, a petition was filed before the 
Court challenging this type of arrangement as 
stipulated in the Law on Presidential Election 
(Law Number 42 Year 2008).29 They argue that 
election for member of parliament and the Pre-
sident should be held simultaneously.   
The Court found that the issue has been 
discussed in the drafting of the constitutional 
amendment. The intent of the drafters was 
clear. The constitutional drafters have reached 
an agreement on the definition of “election”. A 
consensus has been attained that “... the words 
election means for election for member of 
House of Representatives, election for House of 
Regional Representatives, election for President 
and Vice President and election for member of 
Regional House of Representatives. Thus, they 
placed in one arrangement.”30 In a more tech-
nical arrangement, as an illustration, the voting 
booth will consist of five boxes: for DPR, for 
DPD, for the president and vice president, for 
Provincial Parliament and for Regency/City Par-
liament.31 Therefore, Article 22E (2) of the Con-
stitution must be read in close relation to Art-
icle 6A(2) of the Constitution. After the deci-
sion, there are consequences for the prepara-
                                            
27 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republik of Indo-
nesia Number 002/PUU-I/2003 
28 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republik of Indo-
nesia Number 058-059-060-063/PUU-II/2004 and 008/ 
PUU-III/2005 
29 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republik of Indo-
nesia Number 14/PUU-X/2013 
30 Ibid., p. 82 
31 Tim Penyusun, 2010, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan 
Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 
1945, Latar Belakang, Proses, dan Hasil Pembahasan 
1999-2002, Buku V Pemilihan Umum, Jakarta: Sekreta-
riat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi, p. 
602. 
tion to hold simultaneous election, especially on 
the electoral management.32  
 
The Court’s Approach to Interpret Competing 
Constitutional Rights  
The Amendment of the 1945 Constitution 
made major changes, especially in adoption of 
provisions concerning constitutional rights. The 
protection of these rights is the Court task. Eve-
ry government policies should not violate citi-
zens rights. In many cases, provisions on the 
protection of constitutional rights do not require 
any exceptional exegesis. Yet, few example also 
exists where the Court needs to find the mean-
ing of "discrimination" and referring it to the in-
ternational legal instruments.33 
In practice, the court applies more than 
one constitutional provision on the protection of 
citizen’s rights. Hence, it opposes the intersec-
tion of rights or competing rights.34 For instance, 
in a decision to review the constitutionality of 
the Law that set forth administration require-
ment necessarily fulfilled by political parties in 
order to be participant in election the Court 
found that  
“... freedom within the state based on 
rule of law must be regulated in a Law in 
order to ensure, few among other things, 
equality before the law [as require in 
Article 27 (1) UUD 1945] as well as free-
dom of association and assembly [as re-
quire in Article 28 UUD 1945]. Nonethe-
less, the Court found, as stated in the 
Constitution that freedom, both as a con-
cept and action, is not limitless. Freedom 
is paradoxical when if detached it may 
bring damage/destruction to itself. Free-
dom for the majority or certain groups 
may always have the possibility to be lim-
ited merely to respect and maintain free-
dom of other [as stated in Article 28J (2) 
UUD 1945].”35 
 
                                            
32  Sri Nuryanti, “Menyiapkan Tata Kelola Pemilu Serentak 
2019”, Jurnal Penelitian Politik, Vol. 12 No. 1, 2015., p. 
3.  
33 Decision Number 011-017/PUU-I/2003, p. 34-35. 
34 Ontario Human Rights Commissions, n.d., “Policy on 
Competing Human Rights”, Available on website http:// 
www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-competing-human-rights, 
accessed on January 20th, 2018. 
35 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republic of Indo-
nesia Number 52/PUU-X/2012, para. [3.15]. 
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The Court also takes account of balancing when 
examining the application of an ex-post facto 
law in the review of human rights court Law 
(Law Number 26 Year 2000).36 The Court found 
that Article 28I (1) of the Constitution must be 
read with the Article 28J (2). Both articles show 
that the right not to be prosecuted under a 
retroactive law is not absolute. The right can be 
set aside in order to fulfill fairness in accordan-
ce with moral, religion, security and order.37 
The court further provides that the parameters 
to determine a balance in legal certainty and 
fairness must be conducted by considering three 
objectives of law: legal certainty (rechtssicher-
keit), fairness (gerechtigkeit), and legal practi-
cal (zweckmassigkeit). Taking these into account 
in a balanced manner, the retroactive law may 
be justified in a limited fashion, for instance, to 
enforce the law on extraordinary crimes.38 If the 
case concern on the protection of rights, there 
are scholars who argue that judges should put 
more weight to rights and less weight to the 
public interest.39  
In these cases, MK implied the need to 
adopt proportionality principle to seek the ba-
lance between competing rights. The court once 
mentions that "...proportionality constitutes 
principle and morality of the Constitution, which 
can be applied as justification to set aside cons-
titutional rights”.40 This notion is derived from 
the application of Article 28J (2) UUD 1945 
which allows the exclusion of human rights in a 
careful, meticulous and thorough measures.  
However, the Court has yet to develop 
measures to test the principle of proportional-
ity. It is different apart from other constitu-
tional adjudication in other countries where pro-
portionality have transcended beyond border-
lines.41 It also evolves from a principle of more 
                                            
36 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republic of Indo-
nesia Number 065/PUU-II/2004. 
37 Ibid, p. 51. 
38 Ibid, p. 52. 
39  Denise Meyerson, “Why Courts Should Not Balance 
Rights Against the Public Interest, Melbourne University 
Law Review, Vol 31, 2007, p. 902. 
40 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republic of Indo-
nesia Number 9/PUU-VIII/2009, para. [3.23]. 
41  Imer B. Flores, “Proportionality in Constitutional and 
Human Rights Interpretation”, Problema: Anuario de 
Filosofia y Teoria del Derecho , No. 7, 2013, p. 86. 
philosophy to a legal principle and from a prin-
ciple of administrative law to a principle of con-
stitutional law.42 As a comparison, the doctrine 
of proportionality is associated with the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of R 
v. Oakes. The Supreme Court formulated a test 
to allow limitation of rights by Law if they fulfill 
specific requirements. The test formulated as  
“First, the measures adopted must be ca-
refully designed to achieve the objective 
in question. They must not be arbitrary, 
unfair or based on irrational considerati-
ons. In short, they must be rationally con-
nected to the objective. Second, the 
means, even if rationally connected to the 
objective in this first sense, should impair 
"as little as possible" the right or freedom 
in question. Third, there must be a pro-
portionality between the effects of the 
measures which are responsible for limit-
ing the Charter right or freedom, and the 
objective which has been identified as of 
"sufficient importance.”43 
 
A simple way of analysis by using propor-
tionality test is by making few assumption. As-
suming that the purpose of the lawmakers to 
enact Law is “A”. To achieve “A”, two roads 
may be taken: “X-1” and “X-2”. Each road may 
cause violation to the constitutional rights. Los-
ses were presented with “Y”. If calculated, “X-
1” has potential losses far greater than “X-2”. 
However, the Lawmakers choose to take “X-2” 
to achieve “A”. The political consideration of 
the lawmakers is that it is faster than “X-1”. The 
law then is verified before the Court. The Court 
applies the proportionality test to measure the 
political choices of the Lawmaker. Based on ex-
amination of evidence and applying proportion-
ality test, the Court may decides that although 
“X-1” is faster to reach “A” (the goal) yet it po-
tentially cause far greater damage to the cit-
izen. Therefore, “X-1” should be annulled in or-
der to protect the citizen’s constitutional rights 
and it is contrary to the constitutional value.  
                                            
42  Bernhard Schlink, “Proportionality in Constitutional 
Law: Why Everywhere but Here?”, Duke Journal of Com-
parative Law and International Law, Vol 22, 2012, p. 
302. 
43 R v Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
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The test is known as the "Pareto way” due 
to its resemblance to the theory of “pareto-op-
timality” in economics. The idea is how to achi-
eve the goal by measuring the risks of loss of 
each policy considered. The policy that has to 
be taken is the one that earns more but has the 
least potential loss.44 In legal terms, Robert 
Alexy introduced the rule on “Law of Balancing” 
which stated “(t)he greater the degree of non-
satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, 
the greater must be the importance of satisfying 
the other”.45 
The Constitutional Court has not develop-
ed any certain measurement as to establish pro-
portionality test. The court has considered in 
balancing the competing rights.Yet, a standard 
parameter has not been developed. A constitu-
tional justice, Maruarar Siahaan, has offered his 
insight in his dissenting opinion. He argued that: 
"... the test can be done either by “Direct 
Synchronization Test” or “Indirect Synch-
ronization Test”, which is by comparing 
the Laws. ...interpretation is allowed to 
the extent that it does not violate the 
order of Laws, so the Laws should not cast 
any ambiguity or inconsistency.”46 
 
The Absence of Constitutional Ground in Chal-
lenging the Law 
The border between constitutional and 
statutory interpretation is hard to distinguish in 
a case where the Court does not refer to any 
constitutional provision, nor a provision on con-
stitutional right. An example of this type of 
ruling is in the Court decision on the review of 
Law on Farming and Animal Health (Law Number 
18 Year 2009).47 The petition challenges four 
articles in the Law for its conformity with the 
Constitution. The court decides to take a careful 
step by elucidating legal consideration on each 
article separately. The problem emerges in the 
                                            
44 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, "Proportionality 
Balancing and Global Constitutionalism", Columbia Jour-
nal of Transnational Law, Vol. 47, 2008, p. 96. 
45  Robert Alexy, “Constitutional Rights, Democracy, and 
Representation, Richerche Giuridiche,Vol. 3, No. 2., De-
cember 2014, p.200 
46 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republic of 
Indonesia Number 006/PUU-I/2003, p.112 
47 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republic of 
Indonesia Number 137/PUU-VII/2009. 
Court argument on the constitutionality of art-
icle 59(2) of the Law. The Law requires that im-
ported fresh animal products from a business 
unit from a country of within certain area in the 
country must meet the requirement and proced-
ure of animal product.48 The petition question 
the terms “animal product business unit from 
the country within certain area”.  
A thorough reading of the Court argument 
found that there is an absence of constitutional 
article as the ground to review the challenge 
Law. In a nutshell, the Court came to a decision 
that the article is in conformity with the consti-
tution without mentioning any provision in the 
Constitution as its constitutional ground of con-
sideration. The Court took an unprecedented ap-
proach in which it uses legal principle as its 
ground of consideration. In the decision, the 
Court elaborated the condition of “welfare sta-
te” and the principle of “prudence” as part of 
good governance principle. The Court raises the 
notion of welfare state, where the Court dis-
cusses that    
"... in the welfare state, the government 
must actively participate in the economy, 
including the issuance of regulations that 
protect and push towards welfare. In or-
der to protect the public against the pos-
sibility of losses in the economy, the Gov-
ernment should issue regulations guaran-
teeing to that direction.”49 
 
In addition, the Court also emphasized the need 
for the government to act cautiously when it 
comes to the policy of importation of fresh an-
imal products. The country origin must meet the 
requirements and procedure of importation an-
imal products. 
The Court concluded the law is in contrary 
to the 1945 Constitution. However, the Court 
did not provide any further reason the use of 
welfare state and prudential principle as the 
                                            
48 Article 59 (2) of Law Number 18 Year 2009 states, "fresh 
animal products are imported into the territory of the 
Republic of Indonesia as referred to in paragraph (1) 
letter a shall come from animal products business unit 
in a country or zone of a country has met the require-
ments and procedures for the importation of animal 
products”. 
49 The Verdict of Constitutional Courts of Republik of Indo-
nesia Number 137/PUU-VII/2009, p. 133. 
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ground to annulled the Law. Furthermore, the 
Court does not associate these principles either 
in relation to the constitution, whether the prin-
ciple is implied in the constitutional provision 
and whether there is a crucial reason for using 
theses principle as a constitutional value. One 
may assume that this is a part of the Court dis-
cretion in the constitutional review. The ability 
to make discretionary decision in constitutional 
case is central to the mechanics of democratic 
constitutionalism. The fact that there is a space 
in the Constitution for the judges to interpret 
helps ensure that the nation remains bound to-
gether by the project of interpreting constitu-
tional texts.50  
 
Conclusion 
The role of MK to examine the constitu-
tionality of Law requires the Court to conduct 
constitutional interpretation. A few decision 
shows the Court provides an interpretation of 
the constitutional provisions. The phrase "the 
right to control the state" as stipulated in Article 
33 of the Constitution and the provisions on the 
holding simultaneous election as discussed in the 
drafting of constitutional amendment to the Art-
icle 6A and 22E of the Constitution are examples 
of constitutional interpretation given by the 
Court. 
In constitutional review cases, the Court 
does not only interpret the constitution but also 
adopted statutory interpretation. This practice 
is part of the Court's attempts to protect consti-
tutional rights. The constitutional provision that 
rules on the protection of constitutional rights 
are not commonly a single challenge. The issue 
mostly related and cover different constitutional 
provision that leads to the issue of competing 
rights. In this context, the Court considers using 
a balanced approach in the exercise of those 
rights. Nonetheless, the Court lacks a body juris-
prudence in regards to measure the proportion-
ality between these competing rights. 
A glaze over boundary line between con-
stitutional interpretation and statutory inter-
pretation is also identified in the decisions in 
                                            
50  Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Ca-
ses, Journal of Law and Politics, Vol. 26, 2011, p. 140. 
which the Court uses fundamental principles 
without any reference to a certain constitutional 
provision. The practice is regarded as a judicial 
discretion in deciding constitutional review ca-
ses. At a certain point, the extent of judicial 
discretion will need to have its limitations. A 
lack of precedent on the issue is a room for de-
velopment for the Court to consider on any 
limitation to judicial discretion for the sake of 
the Court’s own future. 
Understanding court decisions is never an 
easy task. Ralph Christensen, a German legal lin-
guist, once revealed that "Courts don’t do what 
they say, and they don’t say what they do". The 
aphorism implies difficulties in trying to under-
stand how courts, including the Constitutional 
Court, come to their judgments. However, here-
in lies the challenges and the appeal in the 
study of constitutional law and constitutional 
courts. 
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